What is Research?

Press Dispatches from the East

Rome and Moscow

PROPERTY OF THE
LIBRARY OF THE
JUL 14 1931
North Carolina

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION
Incorporated
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
Eighteen East Forty-first Street
New York

The Annual Meeting

April 29, 1931

Pamphlet No. 75
Series 1930-31
July, 1931

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

What is Research? ..... Raymond L. Buell 1

See footnote 1 3

Reply to Mr. Buell ..... Eustace Seligman 9

Press Dispatches from the East ..... T. A. Bisson 12

Rome and Moscow ..... Vera Micheles Dean 16

Condensed Minutes 21

Membership Report 22

Report of Meetings 23

Financial Statement 24

Who's Who in the F. P. A. 25

The Annual Meeting of the Foreign Policy Association

James G. McDonald, Presiding

THIS year we have deliberately chosen to change the character of the annual meeting sharply from that of any previous year.

Instead of a lengthy report by the Chairman, we have been fortunate enough to persuade some of the members of the Research Department to constitute the bulk of the program. The first of these speakers is the Director of Research.

Mr. Buell, of course, needs no introduction to an F. P. A. audience. I should like merely to say, however, that I think in the years that Mr. Buell has been with us, he has amply justified the hopes and the confidence we had when he came to the F. P. A., and that it is no exaggeration to say that, young or old, there is no more productive scholar in the field of international relations today than Mr. Buell.

What is Research?

by *Raymond Leslie Buell*

IN every phase of human activity the role of critic is important. He it is who defines standards and who tells us when they are violated. Nevertheless if he is wise, the critic does not attempt to apply his own standards. The baseball writer does not play the game the rules of which he knows by heart. The wise critic is not a doer, he is judge. So when the research staff of the Foreign Policy Association attempts to lay down standards of research, it runs the risk of being hoist on its own petard—of failing to practice what it professes. But perilous as it is to run this gauntlet, the risk is worth taking because at times self-criticism is not only good but essential for the soul.

There is no doubt but that in certain circles today the term "research" is treated with a good deal of respect. Our banks have established "research" departments; our great business houses have large "research" staffs; our graduate students do not want to teach, they want to do what they call "research." The reputation of this word has been made, however, not by students of politics or of international relations, but by

workers in the realm of the physical sciences. It was after days of tedious toil and imaginative insight that Dr. Walter Reed discovered that yellow fever was carried by the mosquito; that Sir Ronald Ross unearthed the cause of malaria; that Pasteur learned the nature of fermentation; that Marconi produced the wireless; that Edison invented electrical devices that have transformed the mode of life in every nation in the civilized world. These men studied the facts of nature; they worked upon a hypothesis—they wanted to achieve a result; sometimes the hypothesis proved true and a new law of nature was revealed. Sometimes this new law was put to the service of society.

In view of the great social good which research in the physical sciences has produced, it is natural for people to say, let us probe into the vitals of human society, find out its laws, diagnose its ills and prescribe remedies. So far the emphasis has been placed upon collecting so-called "facts." But whatever the emphasis may be, one of the most interesting developments in American life, during the last ten or twelve years has been the attention given to research in the social sciences. To please the votaries of this new faith, our universities are converting themselves into statistical laboratories; institutes, foundations, round table conferences and research councils galore are attempting to catalogue and classify every phase of human activity; and in the process they are consuming thousands of dollars of capital and the undivided attention of hundreds of personalities.

Yet despite these prodigious efforts, doubt as to the value of the results seems to be becoming more and more vocal. These doubts were summarized by Professor John Dewey in his address to the International Congress of Philosophy at Cambridge in 1926 when he stated, "Especially in psychology and the social sciences an amount of effort is putting forth in America which is hardly equalled in the rest of the world. He would be a shameless braggart who claimed that the result is as yet adequate to the activity."

In a sense, the research work of the Foreign Policy Association represents one phase of this development. Yet it is a modest and unpretentious phase, for we have erected none of the elaborate statistical paraphernalia which mark so many research activities; nor do we try to chart the laws of human behavior, or delve into the mysteries of psychology. Nevertheless, our methods and our aims are basically the same as more ambitious enterprises; and it is natural to ask therefore whether our labors are as barren as Professor Dewey and others believe social research in general so far to be. This question is largely a matter of opinion, and obviously any opinion of ourselves is likely to be inflated. Nevertheless the reception given our work not only by educators, but by journalists and statesmen has been unusually appreciative; and in a number

of current problems we, perhaps, imagine that our researches have helped point the way to a solution.

At the risk of being vain, I might state my own belief that nowhere in the universities is work being done in the field of international relations which is more thorough in its use of facts and more objective in its analysis than in the Foreign Policy Association. While there are a number of organizations who periodically publish valuable monographs on various aspects of international affairs, the Foreign Policy Association, so far as I know, is the only institution in the United States or Europe which attempts to make a systematic and continuous analysis and study of important current international problems. There is much room for improvement; nevertheless the members of the staff feel that the research efforts of the Foreign Policy Association to date have brought abundant returns.

If we feel justified in calling our work a comparative success, it may be well to discuss the methods we follow and to inquire along what lines we should attempt to travel in the future.[1]

The first principle upon which we operate is the principle of individual initiative and responsibility. The administrative machinery of the Foreign Policy Association is not complicated. We have a board of directors which discusses and determines broad matters of administrative policy; but there is no hierarchy, inside or outside the office, which draws up and farms out elaborate projects of study. The Foreign Policy Association attempts to avoid the danger of becoming a factory by regarding itself as a cooperative enterprise of individuals each benefitting from the stimulus of the others but each working upon problems which appeal to his own imagination and initiative. We believe also that each individual should get credit for his own work. We have no ghost writers upon our staff. Incredible as it may sound, despite his manifold duties our chairman writes every word of his weekly radio talks and his countless speeches!

---

1. In making this address Mr. Buell has put before the entire membership his point of view regarding one of the major questions of policy which from time to time confronts the F. P. A. In 1928 this matter was the subject of an exhaustive study by our Executive Committee. On the basis of its report the Board of Directors then reaffirmed its former position—a position which is outlined in the remarks of Mr. Eustace Seligman on page 9. That the question is again under discussion is an earnest, we believe, that the F. P. A. is not a static organization but one which dares to put itself to the test by a frequent re-examination of methods, output and effectiveness.

In the final analysis, of course, we wish to produce the type of reports which will be most useful to those for whom they are intended. For this reason it has seemed to the members of the Board and staff that a question of such vital concern to the Association as a whole, which is subject to so many shades of opinion, is one which should be discussed freely by all those who are interested in our work. While no change of policy is at present contemplated, it would serve a useful purpose if members of the Association and subscribers to our publication would write us their views of the problems here presented.

JAMES G. McDONALD, *Chairman*

Likewise we believe in the principle of individual responsibility and discipline. While a university monograph may be safely embalmed in a scientific journal, the products of the Foreign Policy Association must undergo an ordeal of fire. Before publication our manuscripts are submitted to men who often have spent a lifetime dealing with the problems discussed, and who represent opposing points of view. After our reports are published, they are used by government officials, bankers, journalists, business men and scholars. By the time this checking process is concluded, the author has obtained a training in accuracy which is well-nigh unique. Furthermore, our people must know how to work according to schedule. We have no place on our staff for those timid, deliberate or indolent souls who do not believe in publishing more than once in ten years; the Foreign Policy Association staff must write for a "deadline."

Secondly, we attempt to confine our labors to a discussion of international problems of current importance. The reason that much of so-called research is wasted is because of the subject selected for study. In his book on Universities, Dr. Flexner tells of the professor who expended $42,000 in about three years of time in classifying 1,001 motions of a school teacher. I have just heard of a sociologist who expended $30,000 in an investigation which showed that more girls than boys brushed their teeth every morning! Even among the orthodox students of government and international affairs, there is a tendency to avoid subjects which are contemporary and controversial. Many professors of international law, for example, are more interested in the question of diplomatic immunity and the law of territorial waters than in vital political issues. I do not wish to minimize the importance of abstract scholarship whether of a legal or historical nature; but certainly there is a need for the scientific examination of current international problems.

We do not follow the precept of the Greek poet who believed that "horrible facts should be buried in silence, not bruited abroad nor brought forth on the stage, nor emblazoned in poetry." We may not convert them into poetry but we do believe that "horrible" facts, once exposed to the light of day, will turn and run. It takes courage for an organization, which exists upon voluntary contributions, to be pitiless in its researches, and it should be our greatest cause of satisfaction that we have been able to expand our budget during the last ten years and yet remain vital.

The final characteristic of our work—and here I speak with diffidence because this characteristic is not supposed by some of us to exist—is that it is based or should be based upon a definite philosophy. The research staff of the Foreign Policy Association was founded at the time when what Mr. Morris Cohen calls the "anti-reason" school was at its height. We were influenced by the demand for what people call "facts" as opposed to opinions. This school believes that all one needs to do to

find the truth is to compile and correlate statistics. One should not see the existence of any problem, or seek to find a solution; he should not have any hypothesis, or preconceived point of view or philosophy. He should be rigorously "impartial," and give no opinions or conclusions based on that thought. That our work should conform to such standards is still the opinion of many supporters of the Foreign Policy Association. When some of us timidly set forth our conclusions in the NEWS BULLETIN or in a FOREIGN POLICY REPORT, letters of reproof come into the office, criticising the writer as being "partisan," "propagandist" or lacking in "objectivity," or being otherwise improper!

This insistence upon so-called "facts" as opposed to "thought" or "opinions" in this country is remarkable. Doubtless it is one phase of our materialism, or it may be due to disgust with the blatant nonsense of our political speechmakers which is so frequently at variance with facts, or it may be due to the comfortable desire to be non-controversial; that is, agreeable. But can research be effective when it is simply a statistical process, from which the process of reasoning is excluded? Do facts speak for themselves?

As far as international relations are concerned, the data are as numerous as the grains of sand at the bottom of the Atlantic. It is essential therefore for the student to make a selection of these facts; and how can he select one fact in preference to another unless he has a standard of judgment? If the roof of the World Court should cave in while the Court was on vacation, that would be a fact, but would it have the same significance as if the roof caved in at a time when the Court was in session and incapacitated a judge upon whose vote a judgment depended? According to the "naive" school of social scientists—I borrow the phrase from Mr. E. C. Lindeman's forthcoming book,—the two facts which I have just mentioned would have exactly the same significance, a conclusion which would be absurd.

In his recent lectures on the Haskell Foundation, the English classicist, Mr. T. R. Glover, declares, "In history as in science there is no democracy among facts; all, it is true, have the same right to be understood, but some facts are of vastly more significance than others. The scholar, for whom all facts are of significance and all of equal significance, never understands anything. . . Genius has been described 'as the instinct for the fact with meaning'."

In our own research, we are constantly confronted with the problem of selecting material; and to do this intelligently, it is essential to have a sense of values,—a hypothesis, to see the existence of a problem, and even to try to find a solution.

Let me give another example. Suppose we turn up four facts about Country X—its area, population, public debt, and number of miles of roads constructed. It would be comparatively easy to compile these facts, and write a paragraph or page or two elaborating each fact. The result might have some reference value—but that is all. But suppose your research worker, having a keen and imaginative eye, discovers that the country's public debt of $100,000,000 was for the purpose of building roads, but that while all the money had been expended only one hundred miles of road had been constructed. He would put the two facts together and find that the cost of each mile of road was a million dollars. Again, if he is inquisitive, he would look up the cost of road construction in other countries and probably find it was less than $50,000 a mile. He would then see to his surprise that Country X had been expending about twenty times as much for its roads as other countries. His suspicions aroused, his further labors would proceed upon the hypothesis that there had been colossal graft or colossal inefficiency in the administration of Country X. And by the time he runs down his leads he will have obtained an understanding of Country X which no mere handbook can possibly attempt to do. Just as the physical scientist invariably proceeds on a hypothesis, social research if it is to have results, must not be only statistical and factual; it must be interpretative, and contain meaning.

In a famous essay, Professor William James has said, "If you want an absolute duffer in an investigation, you must after all, take the man who has no interest whatever in its results. He is the unwarranted incapable, the positive fool. The most useful investigator, because the most sensitive observer, is always he whose eager interest in one side of the question is balanced by an equally keen nervousness lest he become deceived." The Foreign Policy Association members have a right to demand that the research staff examine all the facts; but at the risk of being a heretic, I insist they have no right to ask the research staff not to have conclusions.

Out of respect to the Fact Cult, it is our present policy, as you know, to refrain, or rather to try to refrain, from giving any interpretations of our own or stating our conclusions. Nevertheless, and here I make a confession, we have sometimes surmounted these limitations by putting our own interpretations in the mouths of others, by stating for example, "it is contended by certain observers" that this is so, contrasting such a view with an opposite one without declaring which is our own. For example a report might state that "some students believe that the reason why Honduras has had no successful revolution since 1925 is because of the Washington recognition treaty of 1923; while others declare this has been due to fair elections which have been the result of purely internal causes."

The difficulties of this pro and con system were illustrated many years ago by Galileo. This distinguished scientist had angered the Church fathers by preaching the doctrine that the earth moved around the sun. And in 1616 he was hauled before the Inquisition and forced to recant. A few years later he obtained the consent of the papal censors to produce a work which would not support the Copernican theory, but simply present arguments for and against (á la our Foreign Policy Reports.) But when there appeared the Dialogues of Galileo Galilei—"on the two principal systems of the Universe, the Ptolemaic and the Copernican, propounding without deciding for Either, the natural and philosophical Reasons in favor of Each," a storm arose. The work was hailed as the most dynamic defense of the Copernican theory that had yet been made. And poor, impartial Galileo was brought before the Holy Office at Rome, forced to recant and sentenced to perpetual imprisonment. The Foreign Policy Association staff may well understand his plight!

In case a student does arrive at a conclusion after long months of study, it is extremely difficult, as Galileo learned, for him to hide it, no matter how "impartial" he may be. But when the system of research under which he is working discourages him from reaching conclusions or of doing any original thinking, there is an even greater danger that his mental processes will atrophy. That amiable French cleric, the Abbé Dimnet has wisely said that "all children under nine or ten years of age are poets and philosophers," but after that most of us become non-thinking animals, harnessed to the almanac and clock, drudges to organized nothingness and slaves to amusements.

I sometimes believe that even those who pride themselves on being intellectuals find it easier to compile a thousand facts than to have a single idea. Our natural inclination is to postpone thinking through to a conclusion just as one postpones having a tooth pulled or shuns an encounter with a policeman. How often we catch a thought by its tail but then allow it to slip through our fingers because of intellectual timidity or indolence! If one's intellectual processes are to grow he must drive himself to arrive at conclusions comparing fact with fact, establishing new relations, rejecting and creating hypothesis after hypothesis. His conclusions may not be accepted by others; they may not be "true." They certainly should not be binding upon the Foreign Policy Association membership. Nevertheless the result of the effort is to strengthen the mental processes of the individual, and add a little something to the fund of ideas upon which society depends for progress.

Facts may possibly be important in themselves; but their fundamental importance is that they serve as the basis for sound thinking. One book, such as that by Professor Dibelius on England, or by Professor Tawney on Equality, based on a profound knowledge of the facts of English

life, but seeking to explain historic tendencies, chuck full of searching observations and eager to find solutions where possible, is worth a thousand statistical or factual monographs on as many aspects of British life, prepared by our typical research foundations. It is not given to many men to have the profundity of insight or the clarity of thought of a Dibelius or Tawney; but certainly research should not be organized so as to discourage the development of these important qualities.

If our research staff must exercise some discretion in the selection of facts, if their work will take on significance only when it is interpretative and moves toward a solution, obviously it must be inspired by a philosophy. Does an organization whose only requisite for membership is five dollars and a "willingness to look facts in the face" dare to have a philosophy? Certainly the staff would be the last to lay down any creed for our membership to follow. As for our own philosophy, this is a subject which, like many other vital things, such as love or religion, are seldom discussed. Nevertheless, if I were timidly to enunciate the philosophy which motivates our work, it would be something like this:

Upon the basis of our present knowledge and our conception of values, we believe that the prospect of war will not disappear unless the relations between nations are improved. We take for granted, proceeding from our own sense of values, that war is devastating to society as a whole and to the development of human personality. Proceeding again from our own sense of values, we believe that both social and individual growth may be advanced and unjust racial and economic inequalities diminished by the peaceful means of international cooperation.

Although we recognize a general direction in which we should like to move, we are not wholly certain regarding our ultimate goal nor of the means of achieving it. Consequently we seek to discover the nature of those barriers which seem to prevent international relationships from moving in the direction which seems to us to be right. We not only wish to understand these barrers but we wish also to assist in their elimination. With these aims and their attendant values in mind, we propose to study the facts of international life as honestly and as deeply as our resources will permit. This philosophy is founded upon the quiet faith that if all those who subscribe to our hypothesis and believe in our methods, work with sufficient diligence the world may gradually discard the harrowed, cynically hopeless exterior in which it now lives and bit by bit take on the garments of Utopia.

Is this sentimental? Is this unscientific? The "naive" school of social scientists may jeeringly answer "yes." My own belief is that research in the social sciences generally will yield fruit only when it becomes vitalized by some such philosophy.

As for the reasearch work of the Foreign Policy Association, it should in my opinion proceed along its present lines in the sense that our reports should continue to be a thoroughly documented statement of facts, always written in moderate, and objective language, rigidly refraining from editorializing or "wisecracking." Nevertheless, I believe that the effectiveness of our work would be greater and the research staff better satisfied if at times (and we would not, I am sure, make use of this privilege often) we should state conclusions not more vigorously but more responsibly than at present.

As an educational venture, the very life of the Foreign Policy Association depends upon freedom of discussion and the diversity of ideas. The conclusions of any member of our staff should not therefore be binding on any one but himself, and, even he should be free to abandon them later if he chooses! Least of all should the F. P. A. engage in any campaign to have such conclusions translated into action—that task should be left to others. The purpose of giving somewhat greater freedom to our research staff than they at present enjoy is not therefore for any propagandist purpose; but it is simply to allow them to complete an intellectual process—to put the roof on a house for the construction of which they are responsible.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Eustace Seligman, member of the F. P. A. Board of Directors, wishes to reply to Mr. Buell. Mr. Seligman!

MR. SELIGMAN: Mr. Chairman, may I be pardoned just a moment, in order to perhaps present in a word, the reasons which I think have, up to the present time, led up to the Foreign Policy Reports, the nature of which have been criticized?

We all admire Mr. Buell's mind as one which can think through to a clear conclusion and isn't so evenly balanced that it doesn't know what it thinks. I think also we all share Mr. Buell's pleasure in reaching our own conclusions and expressing them. The problem however which faces the Foreign Policy Association, and which I think doubtless up to the present time has led to not adopting a change from a policy which has resulted in such a tremendous growth of the F. P. A., is the following:

The chief value of the F. P. A. is undoubtedly the educational value of the research reports. That is the primary purpose of the research reports— to educate the American public primarily through the edu-

cators and educational leaders of the country, on problems of foreign policy. If we were to change our present policy, the risks we would run, as I see it would be two: First of all, would we be accused of propaganda? No matter how carefully you change the type between the factual portion of the report and the opinion portion, no matter how many hedge clauses you put at the bottom, disavowing the opinions, the question for consideration is: Would not the ultimate effect be upon the great mass of readers of the reports to lead them to believe that the fact-finding portions have been colored by the opinions expressed, and would not that tend to lessen the value of the fact-finding portion, by lessening the confidence in the fact-finding portion, and thus lessen the object which we are after, namely, the increased knowledge of foreign affairs?

I put it in the form of a question because I don't feel, myself, didactic about it, and I don't believe that the Board as a whole is sure about it, and perhaps the reason why we have continued in the policy that we have is for fear of leaving a policy that has worked well and risking a new policy which may not work so well, but I do think that in any consideration of the subject, that is a very important question.

The second aspect, I think, wholely apart from the question of being misunderstood (which is, after all, what this fear of having it considered propaganda is) is, isn't Mr. Buell being a little selfish? Mr. Buell wants the pleasure of thinking the thing through and reaching the conclusion, but how about giving pleasure to the reader, Mr. Buell? Or, putting it a little more seriously, in what way do we get the object we are after, of securing intelligent opinion on foreign policy? Do we get it best by argument in favor of a cause, or by a statement of the facts and the arguments on both sides clearly put? I, for one, believe that on that particular issue, the educational value of the second method is far greater than the educational value of the first method.

Let us say that the question to be discussed is going to be the new Stimson policy in Central America, if in fact there is any new policy. A report sets forth the arguments on both sides, and then it is proposed that there be added the statement that the writer of the article believes that the one view set forth on the Stimson policy is right, and that the other one is wrong. I believe that a person reading the report is far more interested in the arguments being presented than in the opinion of the individual author. I realize, in the case of an authoritative writer like Mr. Buell, the knowledge as to what his individual opinion is is of great value, but I don't believe that it is corresponding to the value of giving the arguments on both sides and leaving the reader to reach his own conclusions by thinking the question through for himself.

The reference which Mr. Buell made to Galileo was an excellent point, and while I have never read his book, I do remember having heard about

it, and it is a clear example of the fact that the most persuasive way of getting an audience, either listening to what you say, or reading what you have written, to agree with your opinion, isn't by stating your opinion, but by giving the arguments on both sides, the arguments for and against it. If you are on the right side, you are going to convince your audience far more by that method that you are on the right side than by expressing your opinion.

I feel freer to say what I have because I happen to agree almost entirely with the views on matters of opinion that Mr. Buell has expressed on many questions of foreign affairs, other than in the Research Department reports, views which are considered by a good many of his acquaintances as either liberal or radical. Personally, I am just as desirious as he is of having those views accepted in the long run. But I merely question the method of getting the American people to accept those views of foreign policy. I prefer the method of fair and full presentation of the arguments on both sides, confidently believing that ultimately the right side will win.

THE CHAIRMAN: We could have a very interesting session at this point in making Mr. Buell's challenging talk the basis for a round-table discussion. On looking around this audience, I see at least one member of the Board of the Foreign Policy Association, who for ten years has been fighting more or less on the front which Mr. Buell has enunciated and laid down here, but Mr. Buell is presenting it as his own view, and one which I am sure will be studied with close attention, not only by individual members of the Association, but by the Board itself.

The next of our Research Department exhibits is Mr. Bisson, who follows Far Eastern affairs for us. We have asked Mr. Bisson if he would briefly give us the picture as it appears to him from the Press Dispatches from the East.

Press Dispatches from the East

by *T. A. Bisson*

A REVIEW of current news reports from the Far East gives good grounds for rephrasing a famous saying to read: "Happy the country which appeareth not in the press dispatches." Among certain circles it has long been suspected that the professional interest of a newspaper reporter leads him to set a high value upon sensational and even scandalous material. The foreign correspondent is apparently not immune from this virus. At any rate, happy countries seem to have quite as much difficulty getting on the front page as happy marriages.

Viewed from this angle, of the three most important Eastern nations, Japan must be regarded as a relatively happy country. Press dispatches are brief and intermittent, and particularly lacking in fire as soon as the close of a Diet session scatters the pugnacious Deputies. In true newspaper fashion, we may therefore safely dismiss Japan with a very few words. After nearly two years in office, the present Minseito government would seem to be as firmly entrenched as ever. The recent cabinet change, far from compromising the Minseito's position, has counteracted the inevitable tendency toward fissures and splits when a party has long been securely in power. Premier Wakatsuki may be safely counted upon to continue his predecessor's policies of financial economy and retrenchment, limitation of armaments by international agreement, and peaceful promotion of Japan's foreign trade. The industrial depression has not spared Japan, and for the first time in its history it is faced with a considerable body of the unemployed. The wide discrepancy between official and unofficial estimates of the number of unemployed that has recently become characteristic of certain countries is true also of Japan. While the official estimates center around 350,000, the unofficial estimates run as high as a million. Despite the admitted distress at home, however, or perhaps more correctly as a result of it, a pronounced falling off of Japanese imports during 1930 made possible a favorable trade balance. This is the more essential to Japan's economic security, owing to the necessity of maintaining the *yen* at par without too great an efflux of gold. The rapid decline in the value of silver has emphasized the wisdom of the Minseito policy which placed the *yen* on a gold standard in January 1930.

Turning to India, I have no hesitation in saying that the present outlook is exceedingly hopeful. The crucial question of what Gandhi is to wear in London seems to have been settled to the satisfaction of all concerned. Even with regard to less vital questions, important progress is

being made. As between England and India, certain significant compromises have already been formulated in connection with the safeguards involving finance and the army.

The constitution outlined by the first round-table conference left financial matters divided between an Indian Minister of Finance and the Viceroy, the ratio being roughly 90 per cent to the Viceroy and 10 per cent to the Indian Finance Minister. The Nationalists have seen fit to object to this arrangement. But they have gone further; they have proposed a constructive solution of the difficulty. It is this—that a Finance Commission be chosen, composed of both Britishers and Indians, which shall assume complete responsibility for Indian finance during a brief transitional period until the new régime is solidly established.

The army dilemma is briefly this. England is unwilling to pass over to Indian control an army largely officered by Britishers and containing a substantial element of British troops. The Indians, on the other hand, see no prospect of genuine home rule while the country is dominated by what they consider a British army of occupation, taking 60 per cent of the central revenues largely owing to the high cost of its British element. The problem hinges on the commissioned officers, whose ranks have so far been almost exclusively manned by Britishers. On this point, however, the Indians have already won out, in principle at least. It is conceded that a rapid Indianization of the ranks of the commissioned officers must shortly commence, occupying a specified period of say ten years. It remains therefore only to work out the problem of Ministerial control during the period of transition, which would logically follow on the lines indicated by the proposed Financial Commission.

So much for the Britain-versus-India part of the constitutional debate. The other part, that is, the sharing of power in the new federated India by the various interests concerned, is far more complicated and difficult. An allocation of power must be worked out between British India and the Indian States, between Hindus and the Moslem, Sikh and other minorities, and provision must be made for the depressed classes. The rights of orthodox and reformist, especially in Hinduism, must be made mutually compatible. The socialistic principles animating two of the leading Indian Nationalists, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawarhalal Nehru, directed toward the welfare of the Indian peasant and worker, must establish a *modus vivendi* with the privileged position occupied by the wealthy Indian landowners and industrialists. To many observers, the task seems hopeless. Nevertheless, I am inclined to go along with C. F. Andrews in his belief that the new spirit that has swept India in the past two years will eventually measure up to its responsibility for national unification. Meanwhile, such authority as the British may retain during the period of transition should provide a stabilizing influence of no small

value. And here I would hazard a conclusion. England's timely concessions have in my opinion laid the groundwork for a dominion of India, free but not independent of the Empire.

The outstanding fact in regard to China today is that economic and political conditions are both in flux, each reacting directly upon the other to make confusion worse confounded. Progress to be real must therefore be a co-related progress in both the economic and political spheres. It is worse than useless to talk of political stability unless the economic factor is kept steadily in view. This fact is obvious in the case of the surplus soldiers, whose disbandment would further political stability *if* the economic order is made healthy enough to absorb them. This fact explains also the barren results of the political *rapprochement* between Nanking and the Manchurian leader, Chang Hsüeh-liang, up to the present. Every indication is that the *rapprochement* is sincere; as such, it holds out the best hope of eventual political stability in China. But to date it has not made the Chinese people feel that it has any specific program for economic betterment. Here is where Communism fits in. The debate as to whether this movement in China is communism or banditry is not academic to my mind. It has aspects of both, it is true, but its essential aspect takes the form of an economic challenge to Nanking. Its leaders are enthusiastic, some at least have been trained in Russia, and they understand Communism, even if their followers do not. Despite the press dispatches appearing in the *New York Times,* their activities are not entirely destructive. The reports of the centralized administration in Kiangsi, of road-building, of demands for gasoline, engines, and medical supplies that leak through make this evident. The movement is relieving a wretched peasantry of tenant serfdom—a pledge made by the Kuomintang in 1927 which it has so far found impossible of fulfillment. Most important of all, it is receiving public support where it rules. How else explain the reports of Communist armies that turn into peaceful farmers when a Nanking army approaches in force? Slaughter and pillage are a part of the movment, it is true; not aimless, however, but directed at the privileged classes. In forming a correct estimate of its significance, it is essential to decide whether this movement is banditry or social revolution.

The Nanking leaders are awake to the serious nature of the economic challenge of the Communists, and realize that it cannot be met by force of arms alone. One important phase of the special People's Convention, opening May 5 at Nanking, is designed to strengthen T. V. Soong's hands with regard to economic rehabilitation. The League experts, Salter, Haas, and Rajchman, have been assisting in drawing up a ten-year plan for China, with certain specified projects upon which work can commence immediately. At the convention it is planned to associate a group of important laymen with T. V. Soong on a National Economic Committee,

whose job it will be to put these projects into effect. Nanking hopes thus to assume the initiative in a frontal attack on the economic basis of the Communist strength. If it can meet the Communist challenge in the economic sphere, its political future is much more secure.

It is easy to lose sight of the forest for the trees in considering the various details of the transformation the countries of the East are now undergoing. Taken in its broadest aspect, the pages of Oriental history for the past hundred years have been recording the reaction of Japan, China, and India to the impact of an industrialized West, which struck with ever-accelerated force during the nineteenth century. The initial reactions of these countries were quite different. Japan staggered for a moment, and then quickly recovered; India completely succumbed; China partially succumbed, but avoided final partition. The recovery in each case has been characteristic. By 1905 Japan was matching the West with its own weapon—brute force. With increasing success since 1919 China won its case by an economic weapon—the boycott. India developed a supreme religious genius and staged a non-violent revolution based in the last analysis upon the sentiments of a religious culture—which defies a literacy test—widely diffused among its people. History has granted us the privilege to be eye-witnesses as China and India fall into step with Japan, and set out on the road toward a free and unfettered development of their cultural heritage. Who can assess their ultimate contribution to the world community that beckons to us all—East and West alike—from ahead?

THE CHAIRMAN: The last of the Research Department speakers tonight is Mrs. Dean, who follows Russian developments for us, and who has been kind enough, as a sort of sideline—I don't know whether she would say it was a sideline or not, perhaps not—to follow Italian developments during recent years. And so she is going to present to us—and I confess to be very much intrigued by her title—"Rome and Moscow." Mrs. Dean!

Rome and Moscow

by *Vera Micheles Dean*

I AM linking the names Rome and Moscow tonight, not only because it is my misfortune to be charged with the task of following events in two of the most controversial countries in the world, but because the developments which are taking place there offer many interesting points of similarity, as well as some striking contrasts. Both Fascism and Communism directly challenge accepted political and economic institutions, and both attempt to find a solution for the manifold problems which have troubled the world during the last decade. The manifestations of each are necessarily determined by the history, political atmosphere and economic condition of the country in which it holds sway. While Communism appears to be the more novel of the two, both as to methods and ultimate aims, certain of its immediate effects nevertheless closely resemble those of Fascism.

Communism enjoys one great advantage over Fascism: in a country with a vast territory, whose reservoirs of natural resources have as yet been barely explored, the government may safely promise material benefits to the population, if not at the end of five, then at the end of any given number of years, and its promises may readily command belief. Fascism, on the other hand, must carefully husband the limited resources of a relatively poor country, and can look to no great improvement in Italy's economic situation, unless it succeeds in obtaining additional territory. This fundamental difference in the economic factors at their disposal is reflected in the spirit of the two movements. Communism is essentially dynamic, it speaks boldly in the future tense, disregarding present difficulties, and has some of the pioneering and experimental vigor which characterized the expansion of the United States. Its boastfulness and aggressiveness are those of raw youth and, if harnessed to useful enterprises, could prove a powerful lever for raising the economic level of the country. Fascism, likewise, is dynamic in quality, and possesses both the virtues and faults of youth; its development, however, is hampered on all sides by Italy's material limitations. The Fascists can promise no millenium: at best, they must expend their energies and ambitions on the modest and ungrateful task of so ordering their resources as to assure a more equal distribution among the various classes of the population.

Both Fascism and Communism are indigenous products. It would be a mistake to regard Communism as an alien system bodily transplanted to Russia and there established by artificial means. Lenin's greatest gift was probably his capacity to gauge Russian character accurately, and to

bend the principles of Marx, devised for a highly industrialized community, to the needs of a country primarily agrarian. Had Lenin failed to foresee the necessity of creating a community of interests between the individualistic peasants and the organized industrial workers, it may be doubted that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" would have survived in its present form in the face of peasant hostility.

Fascism, likewise, is an Italian phenomenon. It represents a reaction on the part of the younger generation, against the defeatism of the Socialists, the impotence of Italy's post-war Parliament, and the results of the World War, which in Italy were denounced as a "mutilated victory." In 1922, when Fascism came to power, it satisfied the desire of large sections of the population for an ordered and disciplined existence under a government capable of enforcing its authority; and today the preservation of social order in Italy is regarded by the Fascists as one of their outstanding achievements.

Neither Fascism nor Communism can be viewed merely as a political or economic system. Each is an all-embracing philosophy, a way of life, and attempts to penetrate all phases of human existence, including science and art. Both have the characteristics of fanatical religious movements: unquestioning acceptance of a doctrine; intolerance of all other political faiths; and a desire to proselytize, to gain converts in the ranks of the unbelievers, by persuasion if possible, by violence if necessary. The dogmatic character of Fascism and Communism is perhaps the principal source of their strength, as it serves to maintain unity in the ranks of the party, and prevents all attempts at inner revolt. It is also one of their great weaknesses. The indoctrination which permeates Russian and Italian education may safeguard these two countries for the lifetime of a generation from any important infiltration of alien doctrines; it may, however, conceivably produce a severe reaction, which will be all the more profound for having been artificially delayed.

In both Russia and Italy the attempt to exclude all but orthodox opinion has resulted in intellectual stagnation and artistic poverty. The bones of a political thesis are always visible through the fabric of Soviet and Fascist writings. The poet, the musician, the painter, even the scientist, is judged more by his devotion to the Fascist or Communist cause, by the "social content" of his performance, than by the intrinsic quality of his work. One exception, however, should be noted in the case of the Soviet Union. There Lenin's admonition to practice self-criticism, which is a favorite Russian pastime, has resulted in drastic attacks on all weaknesses and defects of the economic system. Opponents of the Soviet government can find no better arguments to support their case than the reams of invective daily poured out in the Soviet press against bureaucracy,

ignorance and inefficiency. Self-criticism, however, must stop short of political questions, especially the policies of the Communist party.

Both Fascism and Communism reject the political doctrines of the French revolution; popular sovereignty and individual liberty are relegated to the scrap-heap. The proletariat in Russia, and the state conceived as a mystical entity in Italy, have become the objects of a new cult. Political control in both countries is in the hands of a party which constitutes a small minority of the population, yet claims to govern in the name and for the benefit of the people as a whole. In each case, the policies of the government are dictated by a small inner group of the party which, in turn, is directed by a strong leader—Stalin in Russia, Mussolini in Italy. In both countries the ruling group has taken measures to assure its own perpetuation in power by establishing control over political and economic institutions, the right of association and the press, thus effectively blocking change by peaceful means. This fact is of the utmost importance for the future of the two governments; any attempt at their overthrow would involve resort to violence, and would necessitate destruction of the entire social fabric—a risk which many of their opponents appear unwilling to face. The success of both Communism and Fascism in maintaining a dictatorship despite various currents of opposition is due, in part, to the passivity of the population and its lack of political experience. In part, it is also due to the effective manner in which the two governments have paralyzed the opposition, and to the fear on the part of many groups that a drastic change may bring no material improvement.

It is interesting to note that American liberal opinion has been far more critical of Fascism than of Communism, despite the fact that the former has involved less ruthlessness and bloodshed than the latter. Fascism has attempted no such thoroughgoing transformation of the social structure as Communism, and while it has interfered with individual freedom, it has not attempted to suppress entire classes of the population, as has been done by Communism. The explanation of this difference in American attitude towards the two governments may be found in the fact that in Italy Fascism destroyed existing liberal institutions, whereas in Russia one oligarchy followed another, with a hope of eventual democratization. Moreover, greater sympathy is felt for the attempt of the Communists to modernize Russia's economic life, probably because of the resemblance it bears to the development of the United States.

In contrast to the majority of capitalistic states, both Fascism and Communism attempt to control and plan the economic life of the nation. The Fascist system of syndicates representing all branches of national economy, and its National Council of Corporations, which supervises national production, are mere child's play compared with the all-embracing

system of planning embodied in the Soviet Five-Year Plan. Nevertheless, in spite of important differences, the two systems represent a reaction against the policy of economic *laissez-faire,* and an effort to replace uncontrolled individual initiative by a form of economic organization which may best be described as state capitalism.

Both Italy and the Soviet Union are frequently denounced as obstacles to world peace, and they, in turn, are convinced that the rest of the world is bent on compassing their humiliation or destruction. The Soviet Union is concentrating all its efforts on the construction of socialism within its borders, and is temporarily less interested in the prosecution of world revolution. In fact, I venture to predict that a Communist revolution elsewhere might prove somewhat embarrassing to the Soviet government today, especially if it should provoke some international clash, which might delay, and perhaps even jeopardize, the progress of the Five-Year Plan. The Communist International is no less active than in the past, but Soviet officials have a tendency to regard it as a skeleton in the family closet. The progress of the Five-Year Plan has created a strong feeling of national pride. Soviet foreign policy and foreign trade are determined more by national than party considerations—witness its close economic relations with Italy, where Communism is ruthlessly suppressed.

Italy would unquestionably welcome an opportunity to extend its European frontiers or to acquire profitable colonies in Africa. The sword-rattling which is occasionally heard from beyond the Alps should not, however, be always given a literal interpretation. The possibility that Italy may resort to war in a last desperate attempt to solve its difficult economic situation is not excluded. Italy, however, is too poor to fight, and this consideration, when coupled with the hope of obtaining foreign loans as a reward for good behavior, may serve as a brake on military adventures. The Soviet Union may eventually develop an aggressive foreign policy, in an attempt to win other countries over to its economic system, and thus prove a greater danger to international peace than Fascist Italy. Should the Soviet Union, however, develop into a great trading nation, as it has every prospect of doing, it will have more to lose by war than Italy, and may then be found in the camp of those who wish to conserve, rather than destroy, the existing balance of interests. The future foreign policy of Italy depends more on outside factors than that of Russia. Any move on the part of Italy is viewed with suspicion in France. It is not impossible that the economic *rapprochement* which has recently characterized the relations of Italy with the Soviet Union may lead to closer political relations, especially if they should be united by fear of a common enemy—and such a common enemy they have hitherto found in France.

Neither Fascism or Communism can be regarded as essentially an article of export. Personally, I believe that there is little cause to fear that either of those two movements will be transplanted to other countries in their present form, unless conditions similar to those which produced them in the Soviet Union and in Italy should arise elsewhere. I am not yet convinced that either Communism or Fascism are the only alternatives to the political and economic systems with which we are familiar today, nor that they are the most desirable alternatives. I believe, however, that we must squarely face the fact that they constitute a real challenge, and one which it would be blindness to meet by hysterical recriminations or uncritical praise. Our answer to this challenge should be an honest and courageous attempt to set our own house in order, and to tackle the problems of a highly industrialized civilization in the international community.

"The object of the Foreign Policy Association is to carry on research and educational activities to aid in the understanding and constructive development of American foreign policy."

—From the Constitution of the F. P. A.

CONDENSED MINUTES

THE ANNUAL MEETING of the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated, was held at the American Woman's Association Clubhouse, 361 West 57th Street, in the city of New York, on Wednesday, April 29, 1931. The meeting was called to order at 8:30 P.M., James G. McDonald in the Chair.

The secretary read the notice of the meeting. Upon motion duly made and seconded, it was voted to dispense with the reading of the minutes of the previous annual meeting inasmuch as they had been printed and distributed to members.

Miss Edith Jonas read the report of the tellers, announcing the result of the election of members to the Board of Directors as follows:

Class of 1934

Mr. Bruce Bliven
Prof. Carlton J. H. Hayes
Mr. Charles P. Howland
Mrs. Henry Goddard Leach
Hon. Julian W. Mack
Miss Lillian D. Wald

Officers Elected as Directors

Mr. James G. McDonald, *Chairman*
Mr. Albert Lytle Deane, *Treasurer*
Miss Ruth Morgan, *Vice-Chairman*
Mr. Charles W. Kellogg, *Chairman Finance Committee*

Upon motion duly made and seconded, the report was accepted.

In the absence of the Treasurer, the Chairman presented the summary of receipts and disbursements for the year ending December 31, 1931.[1] Upon motion duly made and seconded, it was voted to accept this statement.

Mr. Charles W. Kellogg, Chairman of the Finance Committee, reported on the present status of the budget.

The Chairman introduced Mr. Raymond Leslie Buell, who spoke on "What is Research?"[2]; Mr. William T. Stone who spoke on "Looking Ahead in Washington"; Mr. T. A. Bisson, who spoke on "Press Dispatches from the East"[3]; and Mrs. Vera Micheles Dean, who spoke on "Rome and Moscow."[4] The Chairman himself then spoke briefly.

Questions and discussion from the floor followed. There being no new business, the meeting adjourned at 10:35 P.M.

Esther G. Ogden, *Secretary*

---

1. See page 24.
2. See page 1.
3. See page 12.
4. See page 16.

MEMBERSHIP REPORT
March 31, 1931

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS:	
Metropolitan Area	3,753
General Area	1,003
Libraries and Organizations	507
BRANCHES:	
Albany	264
Baltimore	426
Boston	1,507
Buffalo	392
Cincinnati	592
Columbus	229
Elmira	210
Hartford	221
Minneapolis	191
Philadelphia	1,004
Providence	370
Richmond	125
Rochester	75
St. Paul	451
Springfield	309
Toledo	122
Utica	309
Worcester	389
TOTAL	12,449



MEETING REPORT
Season 1930-1931



	Number	Attendance
Albany	5	1,508
Baltimore	4	2,269
Boston	11	5,834
Buffalo	5	1,186
Cincinnati	6	2,653
Columbus	6	1,374
Elmira	5	1,135
Hartford	5	515
Minneapolis	4	422
New York	14	12,830
Philadelphia	7	3,519
Providence	5	1,894
Richmond	2	350
Rochester	2	779
St. Paul	5	2,506
Springfield	6	1,013
Toledo	5	593
Utica	4	715
Worcester	5	1,231
TOTAL	106	42,326

Summary of Receipts and Disbursements for the Year Ended December 31, 1930

General Fund

Receipts:		
Memberships and general contributions		$120,857.17
Special contribution for research department		25,000.00
Other receipts		28,414.11
Total receipts		$174,271.28
Disbursements:		
Salaries	$110,192.38	
Printing and postage	22,520.07	
Rent and light	11,206.55	
Traveling expenses	3,935.83	
Furniture and fixtures	551.17	
Office supplies and expenses	5,145.37	
Washington Bureau expense	1,755.67	
Promotion Bureau	7,306.28	
Miscellaneous	5,390.64	
Total disbursements		168,003.96
Excess of receipts over disbursements		6,267.32
Balance, January 1, 1930		2,372.15
Balance, December 31, 1930		$ 8,639.47

(48 Staff Members at National Headquarters)

Luncheon Fund

Receipts:		
Luncheons		$31,874.90
Interest on bank balances		30.18
Total receipts		$31,905.08
Disbursements:		
Luncheons	$25,011.15	
Postage and printing	3,299.79	
Travel and honoraria	2,133.42	
Reporting	599.67	
Total disbursements		31,044.03
Excess of receipts over disbursements		861.05
Balance, January 1, 1930		2,485.66
Balance, before transfer to General Fund		3,346.71
Amount transferred to General Fund in 1930		1,995.68
Balance, December 31, 1930		$ 1,351.03

CERTIFICATE OF AUDIT

We have examined the accounts and records pertaining to the General and Luncheon Funds at NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS of the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED, for the year ended December 31, 1930, and we certify that, in our opinion, the above statements are correct summaries of the National Headquarters' cash receipts and disbursements for the period ended that date.

(Signed) LYBRAND, ROSS BROS. & MONTGOMERY

New York, March 31, 1931. *Accountants and Auditors.*

Who's Who in the F. P. A.

James G. McDonald, *Chairman*
Ruth Morgan, *Vice-Chairman*
Albert Lytle Deane, *Treasurer*
Esther G. Ogden, *Secretary*

Raymond Leslie Buell, *Research Director*
William T. Stone, *Washington Bureau*
Frances J. Pratt, *Speakers Bureau*
Carolyn E. Martin, *Assistant Treasurer*
Olive L. Sawyer, *Assistant to the Chairman*

Research Associates

T. A. Bisson
Vera Micheles Dean
Elizabeth P. MacCallum
Helen H. Moorhead
Ona K. D. Ringwood
William T. Stone
Mildred S. Wertheimer
Wilbur L. Williams

Board of Directors

James G. McDonald, *Chairman*

Bruce Bliven
Joseph P. Chamberlain
Albert Lytle Deane
Mrs. M. C. Draper
Mrs. Learned Hand
Carlton J. H. Hayes
Charles P. Howland
Ellery S. James
Charles W. Kellogg,
Chairman, Finance Committee
Paul U. Kellogg
Mrs. Thomas W. Lamont
Mrs. Henry Goddard Leach
Julian W. Mack
Mrs. Helen Howell Moorhead
Ruth Morgan
Walter H. Pollak
Very Rev. Howard C. Robbins
Ralph S. Rounds
Eustace Seligman
Lillian D. Wald
A. Livingston Warnshuis

National Council

Jane Addams
Robert W. Bingham
George H. Blakeslee
Roland W. Boyden
Charles L. Carrick
Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt
Stephen P. Duggan
Charles K. Edmunds
Frank J. Goodnow
William Green
Walker D. Hines
Manley O. Hudson
Mrs. Simon Kuhn
Thomas W. Lamont
Sam A. Lewisohn
Samuel Mather
Herbert L. May
Bishop Francis J. McConnell
Rev. William P. Merrill
Mrs. James Morrisson
Robert R. Moton
William A. Neilson
George Stuart Patterson
Roscoe Pound
Chester Rowell
Rev. John A. Ryan
Dean William Scarlett
Jeremiah Smith, Jr.
Silas H. Strawn
Paul M. Warburg
Edwin S. Webster
William Allen White
Michael Williams
Owen D. Young

Branch Chairmen

Rt. Rev. G. Ashton Oldham, Albany, N. Y.
Richard F. Cleveland, Baltimore
Christian A. Herter, Boston
George S. Buck, Buffalo
Russell Wilson, Cincinnati
Harrison M. Sayre, Columbus, O.
Edgar Denton, Jr., Elmira, N. Y.
Prof. Henry A. Perkins, Hartford
Charles F. Keyes, Minneapolis
Francis Biddle, Philadelphia
Prof. Leland M. Goodrich, Providence, R. I.
Alexander W. Weddell, Richmond, Va.
Dr. Dexter Perkins, Rochester, N. Y.
George W. Morgan, St. Paul
Arthur C. Dutton, Springfield, Mass.
Dr. Henry J. Doermann, Toledo
Mrs. George B. Ogden, Utica
Dr. Samuel B. Woodward, Worcester, Mass.